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SOCIAL LEGISLATION
When Can the GovernmentIssue a Retroactive
Medicare Reimbursement Rule?
by Robert Schwartz
Otis P. Bowen
V.
Georgetown University Hospital
(Docket No. 87-1097)
Argument Date: October11, 1988
ISSUES
The only issue before the Court is whether the Secretary
of Health and Human Services can issue a regulation with
entirely retroactive effect governing Medicare reimburse-
ment for healthcare providers. The Court must decide
whether such a retroactive rule is permitted by the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act (the "APA"), which defines a rule as
"an agency statement of either general or particular applica-
bility and future effect," or by the Medicare statute, which
authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations to provide for
the reimbursement of the "reasonable costs" of hospitals
providing Medicare services.
If the Court uses this case to determine whether retroac-
tive rulemaking is permitted under the APA generally, the
decision will have substantial impact on virtually every
federal administrative agency. If the Court finesses the APA
issue by relying only upon the Medicare statute, it will have a
very narrow impact, affecting only some hospitals' reim-
bursement for Medicare services rendered during parts of
1981 and 1982.
FACTS
Ever since the Medicare statute was first enacted in 1965 it
has provided that Medicare providers be reimbursed for the
reasonable costs they incur in providing services to qualified
Medicare recipients. These costs are determined by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. Originally these
reasonable costs were determined retrospectively by looking
at the actual costs incurred by each of the institutions that
provided Medicare services. In 1972 Congress authorized the
Secretary to provide some prospective cost limits In the hope
that these absolute ceilings on reimbursable costs, published
before the hospitals provided the services and sought reim.
bursement, would encourage hospitals to be more efficient.
Beginning in 1974 the Secretary did issue annual regulations
providing for prospective cost limits on the routine operating
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costs (like room and meal services) of hospitals serving
Medicare patients. Over the next five years the Secretary used
various systems to determine the actual prospective cost
limits, but each year the limits were regionally adjusted for
geographical factors that made healthcare more expensive to
provide in some areas than in others.
In 1979 the Secretary divided the routine operating costs
that were to be prospectively limited into two different kinds
of costs: wage costs and all other costs. For each relevant
geographical area, the national wage cost limit was adjusted
by an index of local wage costs. This index, provided by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, was figured by dividing the aver-
age monthly hospital wage in the relevant geographical area
by the national average monthly hospital wage. Thus, a
Medicare provider in an area that had wage costs that were 10
percent higher than the national average would have a wage
cost index (and thus a wage cost reimbursement ceiling)
that was 10 percent higher than the national average; a
provider in an area with lower than average wage costs
would have a lower wage cost ceiling, and, consequently,
lower Medicare reimbursement for wage costs.
The 1980 regulation followed the 1979 form, but in 1981
the Secretary changed the formula for figuring the regional
wage cost indexes by excluding federal hospitals from the
calculations. Thus, the 1981 indexes depended only upon
wages paid by private, state, and local hospitals. The Secre-
tary determined that the regional indexes would be more
accurate with the federal exclusion because the federal
hospitals used national pay scales and thus did not reflect
local labor costs. Because the federal hospital wage costs
tended to be higher than the wage costs of other hospitals,
the 1981 change in the formula worked to the disadvantage
of Medicare providers in -areas with substantial federal health
facilities. Local Medicare providers in cities with federal
hospitals thought that the change was economically unjusti-
fied because the non-federal hospitals had to compete with
those federal healthcare providers for employees, and thus
the wages they paid were largely determined by those paid
by the federal institutions.
Although the Secretary had issued all of the cost limit
regulations from 1974 through 1980 in accord with the
public participation provisions of the APA, the Secretary
dispensed with those procedures in issuing the 1981 regula-
tions, arguing that the "minor technical changes" instituted
by excluding federal facilities from the 1981 indexes provid-
ed "good cause" for avoiding the notice and comment
process that previously had been followed. The adversely
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affected hospitals immediately challenged the regulation in
the United States District Court in the District of Columbia,
and in 1983 the district court declared the 1981 regulation to
be invalid on the grounds that there had not been adequate
"good cause" for the Secretary to waive the notice and
comment provisions of the APA. The district court left the
enforcement of its declaration of invalidity to the administra-
tive process established under the Medicare act, and the
Medicare providers were ultimately reimbursed based on a
wage index that included federal hospitals.
Not about to knuckle under to the district court's finding
of invalidity of the rule, in 1984 the Secretary instituted a
formal rulemaking procedure under the APA to adopt the
previously invalidated 1981 regulation for retroactive appli-
cation. Because the method of Medicare reimbursement had
substantially changed in 1982 and again in 1983, the effect of
the 1984 regulation was to be entirely retroactive-it was to
apply only to reimbursement reporting periods that began
betweenJuly 1,1981 and September 30, 1982, the period that
would have been covered by the original 1981 regulation.
After notice and the comment period required by the APA,
the Secretary "curatively" adopted the original 1981 regula-
tion, and sought to recover the "overpayments" that had
been made to the hospitals after the original promulgation of
the 1981 regulation had been declared invalid.
After pursuing their administrative remedies the hospitals
again sought relief in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. This time the district court applied a
balancing test to determine if the 1984 regulation, which was
procedurally properly promulgated, could be applied retro-
actively to the 1981 cost reporting period. The district court
decided that the ill effect of the retroactive application of the
regulation outweighed the inequitable effect of failing to
apply it retroactively, and thus the district court once again
found the regulation invalid. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court, but
with different reasoning. Instead of applying a balancing test,
the court of appeals determined that the APA governed the
promulgation of the rule in question, and that the language
of the APA required that rules have only future, not retroac-
tive, effect (821 F.2d 750, 1987). The Supreme Court granted
the Secretary's petition for certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Technically, very little depends on the actual decision in
this case; the validity of the rule will determine the appropri-
ate reimbursement of many Medicare providers for cost
reporting periods that began during a fifteen month period
in 1981 and 1982. However, the Court is called upon to
address the propriety of retroactive rulemaking under two
statutes-the APA and the Medicare Act. If the Court decides
the circumstances under which the APA permits retroactive
rulemaking, the opinion will be extremely significant be-
cause it will affect virtually every federal agency. On the
other hand, if the Court decides that the Medicare Act either
specifically permits or specifically prohibits this kind of
retroactive rulemaking, it will not be required to address the
applicability of the APA to retroactive rulemaking of other
agencies, and the opinion will be of much narrower interest.
If the Court determines whether agencies can issue retro-
active rules under the APA, it can reach any one of three
conclusions. The first, which forms the basis of the hospitals'
position, is that retroactive rulemaking is not permitted by
the APA. This argument is based on the language of the APA
(which limits a "rule" to a statement of "future effect"), and
on the long history of common law suspicion of retroactive
government action. Indeed, this suspicion was one of the
primary reasons for the public participation and "future
effect" requirements for rulemakig under the APA.
Alternatively, the Court could adopt the Secretary's posi-
tion that the "future effect" provision of the APA requires
only that a rule be enforced in the future, not that the rule be
applied only to events or transactions that occur after its
promulgation. This interpretation of the APA would specifi-
cally permit the kind of "curative" rulemaking done by the
Secretary here. As the court of appeals pointed out in this
case, however, under this interpretation "agencies would be
free to violate the rulemaking requirements of the APA with
impunity if, upon invalidation of a rule, they were free to
'reissue' the rule on a retroactive basis." The Secretary
counters that his interpretation of "future effect" is especially
appropriate where an agency is merely curing a procedural
defect in the earlier promulgation of a rule. He suggests that
the primary policy reason to limit retroactive lawmaking is to
avoid the unfair surprise application of law to someone who
cannot now alter past practice to account for the law's
consequences. Where there has been a timely but procedur-
ally defective attempt to issue a regulation, the Secretary
argues, those affected by it cannot claim that they were
without notice of the government's intentions.
The Court could take a middle ground in determining the
validity of a retroactive rule under the APA. The Court could
apply a balancing test to determine if rules could be given
retroactive affect. Forty years ago the Court was called upon
to determine what retroactive effect could be given to new
governing principles applied by an administrative agency in
the course of adjudicating a particular case. The Court there
said that retroactive application of the principle would be
appropriate only when the "mischief of producing a result
which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and
equitable principles...is greater than the ill effect of the
retroactive application of a new standard." The application of
this balancing test to formal rulemaking under the APA could
yield a decision favoring either side in this case; it would be a
matter of analysis of the facts.
Finally, the Court could avoid any APA analysis by decid-
ing the case on the basis on the Medicare Act. The hospitals
claim that the section of the Medicare Act which authorizes
the Secretary to set up cost ceilings "to be recognized as
reasonable..." requires the Secretary to act prospectively. If
the Court adopts this reading of the Medicare statute, the
APA arguments become irrelevant.
Issue No. 2
On the other hand, the Secretary depends upon another
part of the Medicare statute which expressly authorizes the
Secretary to promulgate "regulations ... for the making of
suitable corrective adjustments where, for a provider of
services .... the aggregate reimbursement produced by the
methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate
or excessive." This provision, he argues, provides for retroac-
tive application of cost limits, and thus trumps any prohibi-
tion on retroactive rulemaking that would be Imposed by the
APA. The hospitals argue that this statutory provision applies
only to adjudications involving inadequate or excessive reim-
bursements of particular hospitals in particular cases. If the
Court adopts the Secretary's reading of this portion of the
Medicare Act, the APA arguments are similarly irrelevant.
ARGUAM
For Otis R Bowen, Secretary of Health and Hunan
Seves (Counsel, Thomas W. Merrill, Deputy Solicitor
General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530;
telephone (202) 633.2217)
1. Neither the APA nor the Medicare Act bars the Secretary
from promulgating a retroactive cost limit rule under the
general rulemaking authority of the Medicare Act.
2. The Medicare Act specifically authorizes the Secretary's
promulgation of a retroactive cost limit rule to prevent
excessive reimbursement.
For Georgetow Univertsiy Hospital (Counsel of Record,
Ronald N. Sutter, 1015 Eighteenth Street, NW, Ninth Floor,
Washington, DC20036 telephone (202) 4666550)
1. The Medicare Act precludes the Secretary from issuing a
retroactive cost limit rule.
2. The APA generally bars the Secretary from issuing a rule
which has a "primary" retroactive effect.
3. The Secretary's "curative rulemaking" defense is unsup-
ported by law and an affront to the integrity of the
administrative process.
4. If a balancing test is applicable, the ill effects of the
Secretary's retroactive rule far exceed any possible statu-
tory interest underlying the rule.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Georgetown University Hospital
The Sisters of Mercy Health Corporation and the Michi-
gan Hospital Association filed an amicus brief pointing out
that they are currently litigating exactly the same issue before
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In that case the district
court upheld the validity of the 1984 retroactive regulation.
The Ohio Power Company filed an amicus brief because
it has recently asked the Supreme Court to review a court of
appeals decision which, it claims, improperly permits retro-
active rulemaking under the APA in a context unrelated to
the Medicare statute. This amicus is concerned with the
effect of retroactive rulemaking by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and the brief argues that the ancient and
important common law limitations on retroactive rulemak-
ing can be overcome only by explicit statutory authorization
permitting an agency to adopt rules affecting past transac.
tions or events.
The American Hospital Association filed an amicus brief
supporting Georgetown University Hospital's interpretation
of the APA and the Medicare statute.
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